Last month, a draft of the “People’s Republic of China Patriotic Education Law” was introduced to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s top legislative body. The expansive law contains 37 clauses that set forth the enforcement of patriotic education in a variety of institutions, including schools, religious communities, businesses, and families.
The new law codifies existing practices, but more importantly, it expands its scope to include Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, overseas Chinese, and the internet. In short, it indicates what the Chinese Communist Party feels are its biggest vulnerabilities for the future control of China: the youth, cyberspace, and Chinese communities beyond the mainland.
A tried-and-true tactic
Since its founding, the People’s Republic of China has promoted several ideological indoctrination campaigns, the most extensive being the patriotic education campaign of the 1990s.
In the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre, the Chinese state recognized that the demise of Communist ideology internationally and democratic tendencies domestically threatened the foundation of its legitimacy. The Party turned to state-led nationalism to revive its popularity. The campaign, which gained full momentum in the fall of 1994, focused on re-educating the youths, who led the Tiananmen protests. It contained three broad goals: the institutionalization of patriotic education, the reforms in history education, and the construction of patriotic public monuments.
To a great extent, the campaign was successful in raising a generation of outspoken patriots who, unlike their parents, never experienced the turmoil of the early People’s Republic, yet benefited greatly from China’s booming economy and rising international influence.
Since his inauguration, Xí Jìnpíng 习近平 has reaffirmed efforts of the earlier patriotic education campaign while adding his vision of the “China Dream,” portraying China as a global power that is seizing back its place from foreign encroachment, into the narrative. He has also established himself as the authority of everything, instilling Xi Jinping Thought into all aspects of education at all levels.
Despite these earlier efforts, this new Patriotic Education Law is significant as the first effort to codify patriotic education practices into law, making it worth a closer look.
Young patriots turned protesters
For a generation, young Chinese have been characterized as increasingly nationalistic and outspoken about their love for the motherland. Now, just as in the post-Tiananmen years, many are again regarded as the biggest threat to the Party’s legitimacy. They have been at the forefront of protests and dissent, as seen in last year’s COVID-zero protests.
Even after the overturning of COVID zero, their dissatisfaction with the government continues to be fueled by the dismal economic downturn and the worsening youth unemployment crisis. They are looking for alternative ways of living to what the state mandated of them. Some are dropping out — which people in China call “lying flat” — to reject the Party’s obsession with productivity. Others are “running” away to escape their pressure of life inside China, and others are “drifting.”
To avoid history repeating itself, the Party is resorting to the tried-and-true tactic of patriotic education as a way to reinstall faith and loyalty and salvage the future of the Party’s popularity, but with expanded scope and intensity.
The draft law seeks to instill patriotism within Chinese youths in all aspects of life. Article 14 emphasizes the integration of patriotic education content to “all levels and types of school” and “the entire course of school education” — a continuation of the earlier campaign. Article 15 targets “all types of school activity,” including organizing visits to national patriotic education bases, more than 500 of which have been built since its mandate in the 1994 campaign.
What is new about the draft law is Article 16, which summons parents and guardians to take on the responsibility of patriotic education of their children at home. This new inclusion blurs the boundaries between public and private space as part of the CCP’s effort to control society from its basic building block — the family.
As Xinhua News put it, “while stipulating that all citizens should undertake patriotic education, the draft highlights the education of children and young people.” To position youths at the center of the law is an indication of the Party’s profound anxiety over losing its support among the younger generations.
Larger scope
While the focus on youths builds on existing practices, the inclusion of Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese is new and significant.
Article 22 specifies that the law should apply to “compatriots” from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese, with the goal of “consciously preserving national and ethnic unity.” Although the implementation remains unclear, the ambition reveals Xi Jinping’s struggle to grapple with power beyond the mainland.
The Party’s anxiety over Hong Kong’s youths likely stems from the waves of protests starting from 2019 preceding the introduction of the National Security Law (in June 2020). According to figures provided to Reuters by the police, about 40% of the 9,200 protesters arrested in the period between June 2019 and November 2020 were students, and 1,635 of them were under the age of 18.
Alarmed by Hong Kong’s rebellious youths, the Party has hustled to implement patriotic education in Hong Kong classrooms by revising textbooks to comply with the Party’s narrative and indicting teachers who dare to stray away from it.
The new draft law will help legitimize efforts to systematically incorporate patriotic education into Hong Kong society. The day after the new draft law was tabled in China’s legislature, Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee stated that Hong Kong will “comply with” the law, as it can “facilitate the building of a mainstream value that sees loving China and Hong Kong as its core.” While the response is likely intentionally vague due to the lack of details in the draft law, we can expect the Hong Kong government to follow suit on whatever the CCP sets as its agenda.
Unlike in Hong Kong and Macau, how the law will play out in Taiwan is less certain, as the CCP does not control the island. Its inclusion may well demonstrate the government’s anxiety over the Communist Party’s unpopularity among Taiwanese youths who increasingly identify themselves more as Taiwanese than as Chinese, despite the Party’s efforts to engage with them to win over their hearts.
Similarly, Article 22’s inclusion of overseas Chinese is likely prompted by the vast and outspoken involvement of the Chinese diaspora in recent domestic issues. During the COVID-zero protests last year, the Chinese diaspora in major cities around the world organized vigils and protests to raise awareness abroad and show solidarity with protesters in China. These protests demonstrated that Chinese abroad could play a powerful role in domestic Chinese movements.
Additionally, a number of countries have already expressed concern about law enforcement activity by Chinese agencies outside of China. According to Safeguard Defenders, there are 102 overseas Chinese police stations in 53 countries, and they have been reported to have intimidated and harassed Chinese living abroad, attempting to use extrajudicial methods to return dissidents to the mainland. The draft law could add legitimacy to these overseas operations intended to suppress dissent among both skeptical youths and established dissidents.
New frontier of control
What is perhaps most noteworthy is the draft law’s emphasis on the internet — an area of rising concern for the Party.
Article 30 of the draft law under “Implementation Measures” demands internet information service providers to not only produce and transmit content that “embodies the spirit of patriotism” but also develop “new technologies and products to vividly carry out patriotic education activities.”
This provision is in line with other recent steps taken by the CCP to regulate cyberspace, such as the list of new rules released by the Cyberspace Administration of China to tighten control over “self-media” (自媒体 zì méitǐ) — those who produce self-made content on social media. Under the name of dispelling fake news and misinformation, these new rules are likely to be used to further censorship over any non-government content on the internet.
The Party’s fear of losing control over the internet is a direct reaction to its crucial role in political opposition inside and outside of China. Whether in the case of Hong Kong or COVID zero, the young and tech-savvy protesters used international social media platforms, encrypted messaging services, Virtual Private Networks (VPN), and other creative internet tools to collect, store, and disseminate information, organize offline activities, and galvanize international support. Despite the extensive censorship system in place, the draft law shows the Party’s hypersensitivity over losing its control in cyberspace.
Implications
The new draft law has been met with criticisms and doubts from citizens online. On the Chinese internet forum Zhīhū 知乎, people responded to the draft law with anger and derision. One user wrote, “I am genuinely terrified,” and another pointed to the hypocrisy of Chinese government officials who send their children abroad while still expecting Chinese people to be patriotic.
Chinese politics at the top level is opaque, especially on the question of whether public sentiment influences policy. The scope and depth of the draft Patriotic Education Law, however, reveals that the leadership is well aware of the Party’s biggest vulnerabilities: its wavering popularity among youths, the extent of its power in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, its influence on overseas Chinese, and the internet.
This rare glimpse into the top leader’s deepest concerns should inform policymakers that the Communist Party’s China is not impregnable. Like any other authoritarian regime, the Party and the leader face popularity crises, despite how they would like the world to believe otherwise.
China is not as cohesive as the Party presents itself, and the success of past patriotic education campaigns should not be regarded as a guarantee for the future. With changing domestic reality and new methods to access information, the implementation and efficacy of the new law are still in question.
